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This study analyses the complex relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and its  
permanently populated Overseas Territories (OTs) with a particular focus on the last 
decade up to the British general election of May 2010. In 1999 the „New‟ Labour 
government published a White Paper, Partnership for Progress and Prosperity, which 
was an attempt to refocus and renew the links between the UK and its OTs. For many 
years before the relationship was rather ad hoc – a situation that can be traced back to 
the compromises, fudges and deals characteristic of „pragmatic‟ British colonial 
administration. The paper details the efforts on the part of the Labour government to 
overcome the legacy of only intermittent UK interest, through the imposition of greater 
coherence across the territories via a new partnership based on mutual obligations and 
responsibilities. It focuses on the two most important aspects of the White Paper – 
governance (including good governance, constitutional reform and human rights) and 
economic growth and sustainability. An assessment is made of the progress acheived in 
these areas since 1999 and the problems that remain. The concluding section provides a 
number of  recommendations in terms of  how the relationship can be improved over 
the next ten years. 
 
A mandate for reform 
A crisis in Montserrat and a UK National Audit Office (NAO) report highlighted 
Britain‟s inadequate organisational and regulatory framework as it related to the then 
named Dependent Territories in the mid-1990s. The crisis in Montserrat began in July 
1995 (towards the end of the British Conservative Party‟s term in office) when the 
Soufrière Hills Volcano erupted, precipitating a period of great uncertainty and 
3 
 
insecurity for the island. The eruption of the volcano devastated the country and by 
December 1997 almost 90 per cent of the resident population of over 10,000 had been 
relocated at least once, while over two-thirds had left the island. Much of the 
infrastructure had been destroyed or put out of use, while the private sector had 
collapsed and the economy had become largely dependent on British aid (DFID, 1999). 
Three reports were published on the disaster, all of which highlighted several 
deficiencies in the UK-Montserrat relationship, including a confused division of 
responsibility for Montserrat between the Department for International Development 
(DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the overly complex UK 
government management systems for Montserrat and the absence of contingency 
planning in terms of how the FCO and DFID would manage an emergency in a 
Dependent Territory (International Development Committee, 1997 and 1998, and 
DFID, 1999). 
 
At about the time the Montserrat crisis was at its height and the first reports on the 
situation were being published, the NAO investigated the action taken by the FCO to 
minimise the risk of potential contingent liabilities falling on the UK as a result of the 
actions of the territories. As the report stated: „Given the Foreign Office‟s 
responsibilities, there exists a continuing exposure to potential liabilities ... Under 
English and Dependent Territory law, the governments of the Territories are answerable 
for their own actions. However, if the Territories‟ resources are insufficient, the UK 
government may come under pressure to provide assistance. Legal liability may fall on 
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the UK if Territories fail to comply with international law, especially treaty obligations‟ 
(NAO, 1997: 1). 
 
The report found that despite the FCO having undertaken a number of past initiatives to 
identify and minimise the risk of contingent liabilities in the territories, the UK 
remained exposed. In particular the NAO noted that the UK was vulnerable from 
„financial sector failures, corruption, drug trafficking, money laundering, migrant 
pressure and natural disasters‟ (1997: 7). The NAO worryingly described the UK 
government as having „extensive responsibilities but limited power‟ (1997: 17). In a 
follow-up report by the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts its concern 
over the situation was starkly highlighted. The Committee wrote: „We are worried by 
the mismatch between the extent of these responsibilities [for the Dependent 
Territories] and the inadequacy of the FCO‟s powers, strong in theory but limited in 
practice, to manage them‟. The Committee further stated: „As a result of this mismatch, 
the UK taxpayer continues to be exposed to very significant liabilities in the Territories 
and, from time to time, these materialise. More generally, we are concerned at the 
Foreign Office‟s admission that everything is not wholly under control and that all risks 
are not weighed and properly covered‟ (Committee of Public Accounts, 1998: v). Both 
the NAO and the Committee recommended a number of reforms to reduce Britain‟s 
potential contingent liabilities and encouraged the UK government to strengthen its 
control over the territories. 
 
Partnership for Progress and Prosperity: a new beginning 
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The arrival of the „New‟ Labour government, the ongoing crisis in Montserrat and the 
NAO and Committee of Public Accounts reports, led to the initiation of a review of the 
UK‟s relationship with its OTs in August 1997. The purpose of the review was „to 
ensure that the relationship reflected the needs of the Territories and Britain alike and to 
give the Territories confidence in our commitment to their future‟ (FCO, 1999: 8). It 
was based on the principle that „Britain‟s links to the Dependent Territories should be 
based on a partnership, with obligations and responsibilities for both sides‟ (idem). In 
particular, it was noted, „the relationship … needs to be effective and efficient, free and 
fair. It needs to be based on decency and democracy‟ (FCO, 1999: 7). During the review 
the UK government consulted with a range of interested parties but it was clearly a 
British led initiative. 
 
In March 1999 the completed review was published as a White Paper entitled 
Partnership for Progress and Prosperity (FCO, 1999). The White Paper set out a 
number of recommendations on issues such as the constitutional link, citizenship, 
financial standards, good governance and human rights. The latter issues highlighted 
Britain‟s desire that the territories should meet certain standards set by the UK 
government and the wider international community. On the constitutional issue the 
White Paper reported that there was a clear wish on the part of the territories to retain 
their connection with Britain and not move towards independence. However, it was 
agreed that a process of constitutional review would be carried out in an attempt to 
update existing provisions and that if any territory wanted independence in the future 
Britain would not stand in its way. Further, the White Paper documented the changes 
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that had been introduced to streamline the administrative links between the UK and the 
territories, including for the first time a dedicated minister for the territories and the 
establishment of a new department within the FCO (the Overseas Territories 
Department). Also, a new political forum, the Overseas Territories Consultative 
Council, was established to bring together British ministers and territory representatives 
to discuss matters of concern. 
 
Most of the reforms were undertaken out of public view, but two gained widespread 
publicity and perhaps best represented the UK government‟s new approach to the 
territories. One decision related to a change in nomenclature from „Dependent 
Territory‟ to „Overseas Territory‟. Several officials from the territories had asked for the 
name change believing that it better reflected the nature of a post-colonial „partnership‟ 
at the end of the twentieth century. Many of the territories at this point were not 
receiving any budgetary assistance from the UK (today only Montserrat, Pitcairn and St 
Helena, which all have significant natural and structural barriers to growth, receive such 
assistance) and they felt, therefore, that they were not dependent on the UK 
government. The second change to the relationship came with the announcement that 
British citizenship - and so the right of abode - would be offered to citizens of all of the 
territories (hitherto only the Falkland Islanders and Gibraltarians had enjoyed such 
status). 
 
The review of the OTs undertaken by the British Labour government was certainly the 
most wide-ranging for many years. The desire of a new administration to assert its 
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influence over a problematic policy area, as the OTs were deemed to be, was an 
important factor underpinning the FCO-led examination. In addition, the fact that the 
Labour Party had been out of power for 18 years heightened the expectations of new 
thinking and new approaches. In many ways the outcome of the Partnership for 
Progress and Prosperity White Paper indicated that the Labour government was serious 
about its attempts to overcome long-standing problems in the UK-OT relationship. 
However, as will be seen, the realities of overseeing such a disparate and in most cases 
distant group of territories have meant that only some aspects of the Partnership for 
Progress and Prosperity agenda have been fulfilled. Indeed, it is evident from particular 




In the White Paper there was a clear commitment to the promotion of good governance, 
democracy and the rule of law. Further, the White Paper highlighted a series of action 
points to achieve these ends, including through measures to promote more open, 
transparent and accountable government; to improve the composition of legislatures and 
their operation; to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and impartiality 
of the public service; to promote representative and participative government; and to 
secure freedom of speech and information (FCO, 1999: 13). The record of achievement 
in these areas is patchy, and was undermined significantly by the serious allegations of 
corruption highlighted recently in the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI). The case is 
certainly not representative of the OTs as a whole, but the deep-seated problems in the 
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TCI must be acknowledged because they highlight grave failures in the post-1999 
approach to UK-OT relations. The weaknesses in governance were seen most starkly in 
regard to the TCI, but it can be argued they exist more generally in the relationship. To 
illustrate the point the situation in the TCI must be considered. 
 
The Turks and Caicos Islands 
A detailed picture of the state of affairs in the TCI was revealed by a Commission of 
Inquiry led by Sir Robin Auld, a former British High Court Judge. The Commission 
was appointed on 10 July 2008, an interim report was completed in late February 2009 
and the full report was released five months later on 18 July. Sir Robin‟s criticisms were 
numerous, but fundamentally he argued that „there is a high probability of systemic 
corruption in government and the legislature and among public officers in the TCI ...‟ 
(TCI Commission of Inquiry, 2009: 11). 
 
Particular areas of concern included the „... bribery by overseas developers and other 
investors of Ministers and/or public officers, so as to secure Crown (public) land on 
favourable terms, coupled with government approval for its commercial development‟; 
the „... serious deterioration ... in the Territory‟s systems of governance and public 
financial management and control‟; the „... concealment of conflicts of interest at all 
levels of public life, and consequent venality‟; the manipulation and abuse of 
Belongerships (a status which confers rights normally associated with citizenship, 
including the right to vote and to be a recipient of the disposal of Crown land); and the 
misuse of wide discretionary powers given to Ministers in the 2006 Constitution (TCI 
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Commission of Inquiry, 2009: 11-12). Stemming from these and many other criticisms 
Sir Robin recommended the institution of criminal investigations in relation to former 
Premier Michael Misick (who resigned in March 2009 after the Commission‟s interim 
report was published) and three of his former cabinet ministers. 
 
The criticisms and recommendations against high profile members of the government 
were, of course, highly damaging, but what was perhaps even more significant was the 
Commission‟s emphasis on the systemic nature of the corruption. Throughout the 
Commission‟s report fundamental weaknesses in the system of governance in the TCI 
were highlighted. The outcome was that the TCI‟s „… democratic traditions and 
structures [were] tested almost to beyond breaking point‟ (TCI Commission of Inquiry, 
2009: 215). Because of these broader concerns Sir Robin called for „…urgent and wide-
ranging systemic change‟ (TCI Commission of Inquiry, 2009: 218) and in particular the 
partial suspension of the 2006 Constitution, interim direct rule from Westminster and 
reforms to the Constitution and other aspects of the system of governance in the TCI to 
help prevent future abuses of power (TCI Commission of Inquiry, 2009). 
 
After such wide ranging criticisms the UK government had little choice but to act. As 
former FCO minister, Gillian Merron, stated after the Commission‟s interim report was 
published: „These are some of the worst allegations that I have ever seen about sitting 
politicians …‟ and „… when things go badly wrong … we need to act‟ (Hansard, 
2009a). An Order in Council, the Turks and Caicos Islands Constitution (Interim 
Amendment) Order 2009, was implemented on 14 August 2009. Once executed, the 
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Order suspended ministerial government and the House of Assembly for a period of up 
to two years (although this has since been extended). In their place the Governor was 
given the power to take charge of government matters, subject to instruction from the 
FCO, supported by a range of other British officials and guided by an Advisory Council 
and Consultative Forum, both of which are composed entirely of Belongers (FCO, 
2009). Soon after an anti-corruption team was dispatched to the TCI to investigate and 
prosecute criminal cases arising out of the Commission‟s report (Financial Times, 
2009). 
 
One other aspect of the Commission of Inquiry‟s report which has not yet been touched 
upon is the parallels it draws with the Inquiry undertaken by Louis Blom-Cooper in 
1986 into allegations of arson, corruption and related matters in the TCI (Report of the 
Commissioner, 1986). Blom-Cooper‟s findings are disturbingly similar to those of the 
2009 Inquiry, when he talks about „persistent unconstitutional behaviour‟ and 
„maladministration by both Ministers and civil servants at every level of government‟, 
leading to „constant blights upon a … society which is already displaying signs of 
political instability‟ and to an economy that „at present is precariously poised‟ (Report 
of the Commissioner, 1986: 98-99). Commenting on these observations, the report of 
the 2009 Inquiry states that „[Blom-Cooper‟s] general conclusions … suggest that little 
has changed over the last 20 or so years leading to this Inquiry, except as to the possible 
range and scale of venality in public life‟ (TCI Commission of Inquiry, 2009: 23). This 
remark is deeply troubling and is perhaps the most significant aspect of the entire report 
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as it strikes right at the heart of UK government policy in relation to many of its OTs, 
not just the TCI, over the last decade and indeed beyond. 
 
There had in fact been strong indications for many years that there were deep-rooted 
problems in the TCI. Numerous studies were undertaken that highlighted issues of 
concern (TCI Commission of Inquiry, 2009: 94-95). As the Commission of Inquiry 
report argued: „… [criticisms] have been identified time and again in official and 
independent reports in different contexts … but to little result‟ (TCI Commission of 
Inquiry, 2009: 102). The FCO was certainly aware of some of the problems in the TCI 
and it did upgrade the post of the governor, but largely it took a softly, softly approach 
to enacting change. Further, the FCO was not proactive in investigating the allegations 
of more systemic corruption that were coming to the fore. Indeed, until very late in the 
day the FCO argued there was insufficient evidence to justify either prosecutions or a 
Commission of Inquiry regarding developments in the TCI (Foreign Affairs Committee, 
2008: 67). The UK government‟s position may have remained the same if it had not 
been for a Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) investigation on the OTs. 
 
The largest number of submissions received by the FAC came from the TCI, and many 
of the authors had taken the unusual step of asking for confidentiality. During the 
course of the investigation the committee said that many of these submissions suggested 
„a substantial measure of financial impropriety [is] taking place‟, including, it was 
claimed, at government level (Caribbean Insight, 2008: 1). The subsequent report also 
criticised the „climate of fear‟ in the territory, with some citizens too afraid to discuss 
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their concerns about the standards of governance in the TCI. Under such circumstances 
the FAC recommended that the UK government establish a commission of inquiry, with 
full protection for witnesses (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008: 7). 
 
While recognising that it is sometimes difficult to assess whether an issue is serious 
enough to merit intervention, the FAC report stated quite clearly that in regards to the 
TCI „[the UK government‟s] approach has been too hands off‟. As a consequence, the 
Committee argued, „the Government must take its oversight responsibility for the 
Overseas Territories more seriously – consulting across all Overseas Territories more 
on the one hand while demonstrating a greater willingness to step in and use reserve 
powers when necessary on the other‟ (2008: 131). The call for a Commission of Inquiry 
indicated how seriously the committee viewed the situation in the TCI, and a few days 
later the UK government announced that one would be established. Despite this final act 
the TCI‟s collapse in governance suggests that rather than being too interventionist as 
some of its critics would suggest, the UK government has been far too lax in its 
dealings with at least some of the OTs and thus many of the original objectives of the 
1999 White Paper have not been met - in the TCI‟s case, clearly so. 
 
The balance of power in UK-OT relations 
The breakdown of good governance in the TCI shows that the UK government failed to 
meet its own objectives as defined by the White Paper. However, was the TCI an 
isolated case or is there a more general problem with UK oversight of - and good 
governance in - the OTs? It can certainly be argued that Misick and his government 
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pushed the system of governance to breaking point and behaved in an unacceptable 
manner. In contrast there have been allegations of corruption in several other OTs, such 
as in relation to the Bermuda Housing Corporation, but these appear to have been more 
isolated (FAC, 2008). So it does appear that standards of governance are relatively good 
in the other territories. However, there are several underlying problems in the UK‟s 
relationship with its OTs that might indicate that its failings are more deep-seated than 
just in relation to the TCI. 
 
Each constitution allocates government responsibilities to the Crown (i.e. the UK 
government and the governor) and the OT, according to the nature of the responsibility. 
Those powers generally reserved for the Crown include defence and external affairs, as 
well as responsibility for internal security and the police, international and offshore 
financial relations and the public service. The Crown also has responsibility for the 
maintenance of good governance. Meanwhile, individual territory governments have 
control over all aspects of policy that are not overseen by the Crown, including the 
economy, education, health, social security and immigration. However, ultimate control 
rests in the hands of the UK as the territories are constitutionally subordinate (Davies, 
1995). Nevertheless, because the arrangements were not intended to be permanent - 
rather were they originally „stepping-stones on the route to independence‟ (Taylor, 
2005, 21) – there are problems. 
  
In terms of the direct relationship the UK government, via the governors, is reluctant to 
use its full powers, even in areas where the governor has responsibility – rather 
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consensus and persuasion are preferred. The UK is aware of the importance of 
maintaining good relations with democratically elected governments and this is 
particularly true when OTs are no longer in receipt of UK government funding – as is 
the case with most of them at present. A further constraint in advancing the good 
governance agenda is the limited power the governor has in certain circumstances. 
There remains a problem with issues that are in the mid-spectrum. Of course, the 
governor can use his constitutional powers - including Commissions of Inquiry - and 
the UK government can introduce Orders in Council, but there is a reluctance to do this 
because of the controversy they cause. As has been argued, „Governors have few 
intermediate levers between ... influence on the one hand and the constitutional power 
on the other, despite the responsibilities they must discharge‟ (NAO, 2007: 26). 
Problems can be exacerbated because key UK responsibilities depend on funding from 
local governments which is not always sufficient. Also, governors often lack the 
experience and skills to carry-out this very particular and difficult role, meaning they 
have to learn on the job and make decisions which may not always be appropriate. 
Further, the views and priorities of the governor and those of the FCO can diverge. In 
consequence concerns that are serious but not extremely so are sometimes left 
unattended and allowed to fester or are dealt with inappropriately. Another issue is that 
the constitutions provide continuous opportunities for turf wars between the governor 
and local ministers. As Taylor argues: „In my time in Montserrat Ministerial attempts to 
encroach on the Governor‟s areas of responsibility and to challenge his powers were the 
normal stuff of day-to-day administration as they are to a greater or lesser extent in all 
the Territories‟ (Taylor, 2000: 339). Tensions are made worse by the fact that the 
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British government and the local government have different agendas and face 
conflicting pressures. Local governments are subject to short-term electoral pressures, 
while the UK government is concerned with maintaining good governance and 
minimising its contingent liabilities. 
 
Problems also exist in Whitehall, particularly in terms of continuity of personnel and the 
limited resources available for the promotion of good governance. In terms of staffing, 
both at ministerial and civil service level, there is little continuity. There was a high-
turnover of individuals filling the post of Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State under 
Labour – six between 1999 and 2010. Further, the ministerial position, as well as 
dealing with the OTs, involved several other responsibilities as part of the portfolio, 
including the EU, Eastern Europe and Russia, South America, and Australasia and 
Pacific. Within this list the OTs were certainly not central priorities. In addition, the 
qualifications of the people filling the ministerial role have sometimes been inadequate. 
Some of the deficiencies at ministerial level have also been replicated within the civil 
service. For example, the OTs team has had six heads in 12 years, while FCO desk 
officers for the territories tend to remain in post for 18 months to two years, reflecting 
general practice in the FCO and across Whitehall (NAO, 2007). As the NAO argued 
„...the resulting lack of continuity and loss of Territory-specific knowledge has been a 
concern for some stakeholders‟ (NAO, 2007: 28). A final important concern is the 
limited funds the FCO has available to encourage good governance and to build 
capability in the OTs. For example, the department was only able to provide £215,000 




At the level of the OTs most are faced with governance challenges that relate to their 
small size. For example, „close communities with personal or extended family 
relationships between officials and citizens, and small legislatures with a lack of 
separation of duties and membership between the executive and the elected assembly‟ 
(NAO, 2007: 31). Further, some lack a developed civil society and a vibrant media, 
both of which can reduce the level of checks and balances on the executive. In addition 
the very limited electoral franchise in many OTs, particularly in the Caribbean, helps to 
distort the political and democratic process. The source of this problem is the special 
immigration status that exists, called „Belonger‟, which only applies to certain members 
of the permanent resident population. Those that have „Belonger‟ status have the right 
to vote; other residents do not. As a consequence the franchise is much restricted. For 
example, in the TCI prior to the partial suspension of the constitution only about 7,000 
people were allowed to vote out of a total population of 36,000 and these 7,000 were 
spread across 15 constituencies, the smallest of which had 190 voters. There is evidence 
to suggest that Misick‟s Progressive National Party (PNP) took advantage of the limited 
franchise to win power (TCI Commission of Inquiry, 2009: 79).  
 
Constitutional review and human rights 
Before concluding this section on governance it is necessary to consider two other 
issues that emanated from the White Paper: constitutional reform and the requirement of 
the territories to reform and modernise their human rights provisions. On the first issue 
the UK government maintained that reform should be evolutionary and during 2001 set 
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in motion a constitutional review process for the OTs. For the first time the process was 
supposedly „locally owned and driven rather than directed from London‟ (Foreign 
Affairs Committee, 2004: 7). Despite this the UK had clear lines beyond which reform 
was not possible unless independence was the end objective. In a memorandum 
submitted on 27 October 2003 by the FCO Minister Bill Rammell to the FAC, strict 
limits were placed on territories‟ constitutional room for manoeuvre. The final sentence 
of the memorandum stated: „OT governments should not expect that in the 
Constitutional Reviews … the UK will agree to changes in the UK Government‟s 
reserved powers, or which would have implications for the independence of the 
judiciary and the impartiality of the civil service‟ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2004: 9). 
Whereas Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands can both now claim „post-colonial‟ 
constitutions – in the sense that both the administering power and the territory agree that 
the responsibilities set out in the constitution have resulted in a relationship that is no 
longer a colonial one - in the constitutions agreed recently for British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, St Helena (plus Ascension and Tristan da Cunha), Pitcairn and TCI 
only limited new responsibilities were devolved to the territories. However, even these 
changes further exacerbated rather than addressed the structural and operational 
problems in the UK-OT relationship considered above. Indeed, the new TCI 
constitution introduced in 2006 actually helped to facilitate the breakdown in good 
governance that occurred. As the Commission of Inquiry stated: „The 2006 
Constitution, to a far greater extent than its 1988 predecessor, leaves individual Cabinet 
Ministers with a wealth of discretions, by way of grants, exemptions, concessions, 
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discounts etc. to override or side-step matters of principle or orderly and fair 
administration‟ (2009: 216). 
 
With regard to the issue of human rights, the UK government made clear that „high 
standards of observance‟ were required (FCO, 1999: 20). The White Paper indicated 
three particular issues on which the UK government wanted reform: judicial corporal 
punishment, capital punishment and legislation outlawing homosexual acts between 
consenting adults in private. Progress was made on the first two issues but the issue of 
decriminalising homosexuality was more problematic. Despite lengthy consultations 
there remained strong resistance to decriminalisation. Many in the territories believed 
the issue was a local one and local views and predispositions should take precedence 
over British demands. However, in early 2001, despite widespread controversy the UK 
government passed an Order in Council to force the change in legislation. It is 
interesting to note, however, that although the law was changed the view of many has 
not and in some territories (for example Bermuda and Gibraltar) local differences 
remain, with the age of consent for male homosexuals remaining higher than for other 
citizens. 
 
Since then the FCO, sometimes in collaboration with DFID, has maintained an interest 
in human rights in the OTs, which includes an objective to extend all the key human 
rights conventions to the OTs. In addition the UK government has responsibility for 
ensuring that the OTs fulfil their obligations from the conventions which have been 
extended to them. To assist in this process DFID is funding a £1 million four-year 
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programme to build human rights capacity in the OTs (FAC, 2008: 82). Some real 
progress was made when in their new constitutions Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands, 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, TCI, and St Helena included sections protecting 
human rights. However, even here there is disappointment. Concerns have been raised 
about an aspect of the new Cayman Islands constitution – the narrow scope of section 
16 dealing with non-discrimination (The Cayman Islands Constitution Order, 2009: 17-
18). Human Rights Watch (HRW) criticised the language highlighting the absence of a 
free-standing guarantee of equality before the law and the limitation of anti-
discrimination protections only to rights expressly included in the constitution (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009). Furthermore section 16 limits the scope of protection to 
discrimination by the government - thus horizontal discrimination by private entities is 
not forbidden. Hence it is likely that the new constitution will be inadequate to properly 
safeguard the rights of certain groups within society. Indeed it was alleged that the 
scope of section 16 was narrowed by the Cayman government at the last moment after 
representations were made by religious and other civil society groups. The intention 
was to deny protections to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009). The result is that the Cayman Islands new constitution is likely to be at 
variance with its commitments under various UN conventions and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such a situation is 
unfortunate in its own terms, but it also reflects badly on the UK as it is ultimately 




If all these issues are brought together there is certainly more than a nagging suspicion 
that despite the changes enacted under the White Paper problems of oversight and 
engagement continue. One former FCO official has suggested that HMG still treats the 
OTs „as being mostly of peripheral interest‟ (FAC, 2008: 131). Weaknesses in 
Whitehall, exacerbated by a loss of institutional memory through the high-turnover of 
ministers and civil servants and the restricted powers of governors, can and do have a 
serious detrimental impact on policy. This is, of course, important, as proper UK 
oversight is vital in territories where institutional capacity, developed civil society, 
strong legislatures and vibrant media are lacking. Nevertheless, the structure and 
dynamics of the UK-OT relationship seem just about adequate when there is good faith 
and responsibility on both sides. When the system of governance is really tested, 
however, as in the case of the TCI, the imbalances and weaknesses in the system are 
starkly highlighted and standards of governance can deteriorate quite significantly. 
 
Economic growth and sustainability 
Beyond the political sphere the White Paper focused on the need to improve the 
regulation of the offshore financial service industries in the OTs and to encourage 
sustainable economic development, in part by improving financial procedures and 
controls via, for example, improved auditing and financial accountability (FCO, 1999: 
6, 25). As with the political issues considered above progress on the economic agenda 
has been variable and there has been a degree of complacency on the part of HMG, 
particularly in relation to the sustainability of certain OT economies. Consideration of 
this aspect of the White Paper comes later, but first an assessment is made as to whether 
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the commitment to improve the regulation of the offshore financial service industries 
has been achieved. 
 
Offshore financial services 
The offshore financial sector is extremely important to the economies of many OTs 
both in terms of GDP and employment. For example, in the Cayman Islands over 50 per 
cent of GDP is derived from offshore financial services and a quarter of all 
employment. Bermuda, British Virgin Islands and Gibraltar also have significant 
interests in the sector, while Anguilla and TCI have a more modest interest (Foot, 2009: 
24). Each territory provides a particular niche service: Bermuda is the third largest 
centre for reinsurance in the world and the second largest captive insurance domicile, 
Cayman Islands is the world‟s leading centre for hedge funds, while British Virgin 
Islands is the leading domicile for international business companies (Foot, 2009: 16). 
Notwithstanding, concerns have been raised about the probity of the offshore financial 
sector. A key source of criticism came in 1997 from the NAO report on contingent 
liabilities. The report concluded that the offshore sector was vulnerable to abuses by 
money launderers and drug traffickers and the territories faced possible financial sector 
failure as a consequence (NAO, 1997). In response the UK government commissioned 
consultants KPMG in 1999 to undertake a report reviewing the OTs‟ compliance with 
international standards and best practice in financial regulation. The report 
recommended a number of proposals that the OTs agreed to implement. The key 
measures were the establishment of independent regulatory authorities, the introduction 
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of investigative powers to assist enquiries by overseas regulators and the creation of 
comprehensive anti-money laundering frameworks (KPMG, 2000). 
 
It is important to recognise, however, that bi-lateral efforts involving the UK and the 
OTs to improve regulatory oversight of the offshore financial sector have not been 
carried out in a vacuum. International demands for greater control over offshore finance 
have also been very important with the involvement of organisations such as the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which promotes policies to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing; the Financial Stability Board (formerly the Financial 
Stability Forum) which promotes the implementation of effective regulatory and 
supervisory policies; the International Monetary Fund via its Financial Sector 
Assessment Programme; the European Union (EU) via its savings tax directive; and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) formerly through its 
„Harmful Tax Competition Initiative‟ (HTCI) and more recently via its Global Forum 
and „internationally agreed tax standard‟ to encourage financial centres to share 
information with tax authorities. The level of oversight over the offshore financial 
sector is thus now substantive, but in several cases the process of adopting new 
regulation has been controversial. For example, in relation to the ultimately 
unsuccessful HTCI, Persaud argued: „Rule-making by the OECD for non-OECD states 
is of questionable international legality‟ (Persaud, 2001: 202), while Sanders called the 
OECD action the „usurpation of global governance‟ (Sanders, 2003: 6). Further, the 
Cayman Islands raised „holy hell‟ about the lack of consultation over the EU savings tax 
directive (FAC, 2008: 46). 
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Regulatory standards today 
It is clear that the UK government has taken a significant interest in the territories‟ 
financial service industries. As a consequence the OTs are largely compliant with the 
key international regulatory regimes. For example, all territories meet the OECD‟s 
internationally agreed tax standard and in addition improvements have made been in the 
regulatory environment more generally. For example, the size of the regulatory 
authority in each territory has generally been on a rising trend. Bermuda and Gibraltar 
have more than doubled the number of staff employed since 2002, whilst the British 
Virgin Islands has increased staff resources by more than 60 per cent (Foot, 2009: 41).  
The NAO commended these changes as „major improvements‟ (2007: 21). 
 
However, as the IMF‟s Financial Sector Assessment Programme highlights, there are 
still improvements to be made, both in terms of delivering effective regulation in 
banking, insurance and securities and in fighting financial crime. For example, Gibraltar 
in 2007 and Bermuda in 2008 were assessed as needing to do more in order to meet 
particular FATF recommendations (IMF 2007, 2008). Further, concerns have been 
raised about the limited number of suspicious transaction reports (particularly in 
Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, and TCI) and the low level of prosecutions for finance 
related crime (for example, there was just a single money laundering prosecution in 
Bermuda in 2008) (Foot, 2009: 53, 55; NAO, 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, the larger territories are doing better than the smaller ones. As the NAO 
found Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Gibraltar were „leaving in 
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their wake the weaker regulatory capacity‟ of Anguilla, Montserrat and TCI (NAO, 
2007: 5). As Foot argues the scope for improvement „is most evident in the smaller 
Territories, where compliance costs bear most heavily because of a lack of economies 
of scale and the difficulty of attracting staff with the necessary expertise‟ (2009: 39). 
This is particularly true for Anguilla and TCI, both of whom employ less than 10 staff 
to supervise financial services providers. It is argued this is below the „critical mass‟ to 
keep up with the ever-evolving international regulatory framework (NAO, 2007: 6; 
Foot, 2009: 41). This is worrying as the Governor retains direct responsibility for the 
regulation of international finance in these small territories. Indeed, mirroring the 
criticisms made in relation to safeguarding good governance, it can be argued that the 
UK government via its governors has not been sufficiently engaged in overseeing good 
practice in the offshore financial industries of the smallest territories, despite the 
enactment of high-profile reforms such as the EU savings tax directive. As the 
Committee of Public Accounts (CPA) noted, the „Governors have not used their reserve 
powers to rectify [weak investigative capacity]‟ and the UK has been „complacent‟ in 
not acting more decisively (CPA, 2008: 5). 
 
Although the OTs are making attempts to comply with global standards of financial 
regulation there are still concerns that small jurisdictions lack the necessary resources 
for proper supervision. Bermuda, British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands are small 
countries with large financial sectors in proportion to their size and this remains 
problematic in terms of proper oversight of the industry. Presently Cayman Islands is 
listed on the US State Department‟s list of countries of primary concern in relation to 
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money laundering (US State Department, 2010). Further, the then US-presidential 
candidate Barack Obama made specific mention of Cayman Islands and its role in 
alleged tax evasion. Obama stated: „There‟s a building in the Cayman Islands that 
houses supposedly 12,000 US-based corporations [referring to Ugland House, the 
Cayman Islands‟ office of law firm, Maples and Calder]. That‟s the biggest building in 
the world of the biggest tax scam in the world, and we know which one it is‟ (The 
Guardian, 2009). Despite such concerns a recent report commissioned by the UK 
government to review the UK‟s offshore financial centres said little on these matters 
(Foot, 2009). As a consequence, there is no threat to the OTs‟ offshore financial sector 
in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it can be argued that regulation of the offshore 
financial service industries in the OTs has been patchy since the White Paper - 
particularly so for the smaller jurisdictions - and this is troubling. 
 
Sustainable economic development 
Over much of the last decade there is no doubt that many OTs have experienced rapid 
economic growth. For example, real GDP growth in Bermuda averaged 4.4 per cent a 
year between 2003 and 2007, while in Gibraltar growth in 2008/9 was estimated at 6 per 
cent (Foot, 2009: 25). Growth in the Caribbean territories has also been strong. This in 
turn has consolidated the territories‟ excellent GDP per capita figures. Bermuda, for 
example, had a GDP per capita of US$91,477 in 2007 (Bermuda Department of 
Statistics, 2009: 7), while Cayman Islands had a GDP per capita of US$57,016 in the 
same year (Cayman Islands Economics and Statistics Office, 2009). However, in the 
last couple of years the effects of the global economic downturn have impacted very 
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heavily on many OTs and this has undermined the UK‟s stated aim in the White Paper 
to „help [the OTs] achieve sustainable development‟ through „sensible economic and 
financial management‟ (FCO, 1999: 30). 
 
Despite the OTs relatively high levels of economic development most rely on a few key 
industries – particularly financial services, tourism and construction – for both 
government revenue and employment. The proportion of government revenue generated 
by financial services and tourism is approximately 50 per cent for the majority of 
territories, whilst they account for between 23 per cent and 48 per cent of employment 
(Foot, 2009: 23). The vulnerability of government revenue is particularly acute since the 
Caribbean territories and Bermuda have a narrow revenue base. There are no taxes 
levied on income, profits and capital gains, nor are there sales or value added taxes. 
Rather revenue is derived from a combination of import duties, financial sector licence 
fees and other specific charges (Foot, 2009: 24). Thus many OT economies are 
„particularly exposed to economic shocks‟ (Foot, 2009: 25). The one exception to this is 
Gibraltar because it has one of the most diversified economies amongst the territories, 
with income from shipping, tourism, financial services, and internet gaming. In addition 
the Falklands economy continues to diversify, with greater emphasis on tourism and 
commercial fishing and the future possibility of oil extraction. 
 
The Caribbean territories and Bermuda have suffered during the recession from reduced 
activity in their financial services sector and declines in tourist arrivals and 
construction. For example, in the British Virgin Islands new international business 
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company incorporations fell by 44 per cent between September and December 2008 
compared to the same period in 2007, while Anguilla and the Cayman Islands suffered 
declines in tourist arrivals in 2009 of 22.6 per cent and 10.2 per cent respectively (Foot, 
2009: 26; Caribbean Tourism Organisation, 2010). Therefore the negative impact on 
public finances has been significant, particularly for Anguilla, Cayman Islands, and TCI 
(the latter‟s situation being exacerbated by the previous government‟s corruption and 
mismanagement). In response the UK has shown a new determination help correct the 
structural imbalances in the OT economies and this is of course welcome and necessary. 
However, it is unfortunate the UK waited so long to act despite the commitments 
enshrined within the White Paper. It can be argued that the impressive levels of 
economic growth during the mid-2000s helped to hide the serious structural problems 
present in the OT economies and as a consequence the UK felt that any reforms could 
be delayed. Unfortunately the shortcomings of this approach can now be seen. 
 
One further example that illustrates the impact of the recent global economic downturn 
on the economic development of the OTs is the case of St Helena, the second poorest of 
the territories in terms of GDP per capita (NAO, 2007: Appendix 2). For many years the 
principal link with the isolated island, which is 2,000 km from its nearest neighbour, has 
been the ageing supply and passenger vessel RMS St Helena, which calls at the island 
from the UK twice a year and is due to be withdrawn from service.  After several years 
of lobbying DFID agreed in 2005 that St Helena should have its own airport within five 
years as an essential means of attracting inward investment, enabling the island to 
develop its economy - including tourism - and to offset its limited natural resources, 
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high import dependency, relatively large public sector and outward migration. 
However, in December 2008 DFID decided to freeze the airport plan in view of the 
economic climate and took the opportunity to consider potential savings to the airport 
contract and a possible public private partnership (Hansard, 2009b). This decision was 
reversed by the Coalition Government on 22 July 2010 when the Secretary of State for 
International Development announced that „provided certain conditions are met, the best 
long-term solution from an economic and financial perspective for both HMG and St Helena is 
to construct an airport‟ (Hansard, 2010). Provided that this decision is followed through, the 
population decline noted by the NAO (2007: 55) may eventually be halted and the 
current level of aid – £35.7 million in bilateral aid in 2008/9 – will ultimately be 
reduced. 
 
Beyond the broad economic vulnerabilities of the OTs, concerns have also been raised 
about the inadequate financial procedures and controls in place. In its 2007 report the 
NAO highlighted the fact that many territories „have difficulty producing timely, 
audited public accounts‟ and most significantly suggested „the situation appears much 
the same as it was ten years ago, when half of populated Territories were two years or 
more “behind”‟ (NAO, 2007: 31). The NAO also stated that „a capable external audit 
function is not seen as a priority by all Territory governments‟ (2007: 31). For example, 
staffing levels in the Auditor General‟s office in the British Virgin Islands was one-third 
below complement in 2007 (NAO, 2007: 31). There were also concerns over the 
independence of audit officers. To overcome such problems both Anguilla and the 
Falkland Islands have their accounts audited by external agencies. Other difficulties 
were highlighted more recently in the Foot report. Foot noted „the absence of timely and 
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reliable data and of the expertise to analyse [economic] trends‟ (Foot, 2009: 29). He 
also criticised the „weaknesses in data quality‟ (idem) in some territories. For example, 
Anguilla, Cayman Islands and TCI overestimated significantly their expected revenue 
take during 2008-09 (Foot, 2009: 29). The weaknesses in data quality and auditing 
procedures have largely been left unattended since the White Paper. If they had been 
corrected the worst effects of the global economic downturn might have been mitigated. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The 1999 White Paper set out a clear, necessary and generally comprehensive plan of 
action to improve the governing arrangements between the UK and its OTs. However, 
the results 10 years on have been only partially successful. There are three main reasons 
for this. First, the nature of the relationship remains very complex and dynamic which 
provides continuous challenges for the UK government, the governors and the local 
territory governments to overcome. Second, governors‟ powers remain limited in 
several respects and this inhibits the UK government‟s ability to deal with problems in 
the OTs. Third, the UK government and the OT governments failed to act with due care 
and attention when it came to properly maintaining the relationship. The UK did not 
fully engage and intervene in the OTs even when its interests were at stake, while in 
many cases the territories (particularly those in the Caribbean) showed a disregard for 
maintaining the highest standards of good governance and financial probity - illustrated 
recently and most clearly in the TCI. So in light of these problems, what improvements 




First, links between the UK and the OTs should be strengthened, deepened and in some 
areas made more nuanced. Thus we endorse the view taken by the FAC who suggested 
that the partnership concept between the UK and the OTs must be based on something 
more than an annual meeting of the Overseas Territories Consultative Committee 
(OTCC) and who argued that „properly consulting and representing the OTs on issues 
that affect them is an important part of creating the type of “modern partnership” which 
may prevent the need for direct intervention‟ (2008: 130). This would also mean more 
varied approaches and policies to deal with the diversity amongst the territories. In 
addition, there should be more regular consultation by the UK government with the OT 
representatives based in London, as well as greater openness in publishing documents 
and reporting on meetings of the OTCC. In addition, the FAC‟s recommendation that 
governors of the OTs ought to use their reserve powers to bring in more external 
investigators or prosecutors to strengthen investigative capacity (2008: 98) should be 
implemented. Indeed, the UK‟s entire approach towards the OTs must be more 
consistently pro-active than before. However, there are worrying signs in regard to the 
TCI that the UK is still reluctant to use all its available powers and to undertake all the 
necessary reforms to clean up the political system. If the UK fails in its task it will be a 
dereliction of its duty and risks „undermining its own credibility in its use of reserved 
powers in not just the TCI but in the other Overseas Territories‟ (Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 2010: 13).  
 
Second, the position of the UK government and its governors must be strengthened. For 
example, there should be greater continuity in the appointment of ministers responsible 
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for the OTs and a requirement that the incumbent holds fewer responsibilities so that 
they can devote more time to the territories. Further, the process of familiarising newly 
appointed governors with the OTs should be reinforced and OT administration and 
governance should be developed as a distinct specialism and career path within 
Whitehall.  
 
Third, there needs to be better sharing of information and good practice across the OTs 
via cross-Territory training and conferences and support for short term secondments and 
personnel exchange. Importantly, this training, and support must be overtly focused on 
specific objectives. Above all, the development of  a stronger culture of integrity in the 
OTs is a necessity, otherwise any initiatives will come to nought.  
 
Clearly, further change is needed if the objectives of the 1999 White Paper are to be 
finally met. However, the recent spending cuts announced by the new Conservative-led 
coalition government will not make real reform any easier to achieve. The FCO‟s 
budget is scheduled to be cut, and this could impact negatively on the administrative 
and financial support given to the OTs. It is true that DFID‟s budget will increase but its 
main interests lie not with the territories. Under such circumstances the UK‟s level of 
engagement with the OTs may well decline. The key message emerging from this paper 
is that this would be a mistake, and potentially a costly one. The failure to maintain and 
more importantly improve standards of governance in the territories would undoubtedly 
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